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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 900088 
v. : 
PEGGY B. JOHNSON, * Category No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-
101(3)(b) and 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990) and overlooked State v. 
Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1989), in reversing defendant's 
conviction of attempted first degree murder based on the 
administration of oxalic acid to her husband. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement 
of the case is generally sufficient: 
Defendant Peggy B. Johnson was charged 
with three separate counts of attempted first 
degree murder of her husband, Danny Johnson, 
and one count of distribution of a controlled 
substance for value. With respect to the 
attempted murder charges, count I charged an 
attempt to use heroin to cause her husband's 
death, and counts II and III charged attempts 
to use, respectively, amphetamines and oxalic 
acid to achieve the same end. Johnson was 
found guilty on all three counts and was also 
found guilty of distribution of a controlled 
substance for value. She was sentenced to 
three concurrent prison terms of five years 
to life. 
State v. Johnson. No. 900088, slip op. at 1 (Utah Nov. 1, 1991) 
(a copy of the full opinion is attached as an addendum). On 
appeal, the Court affirmed the conviction of attempted first 
degree murder1 on count I but reversed the convictions for the 
same offense on counts II and III. Ibid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in 
the Statement of the Case, above, or in the argument portion of 
this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reversing defendant's conviction of attempted first 
degree murder on count III, which was based on defendant's 
attempt to kill her husband by administering oxalic acid to him, 
the Court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-101(3)(b) and 76-
5-202(1)(n) and overlooked State v. Pappas, 707 P.2d 1169 (Utah 
1989), which makes clear that Utah's attempt statute, which 
rejects the defense of impossibility, focuses primarily on an 
actor's subjective criminality. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has misinterpreted or overlooked the relevant law. See Cummins 
v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The 
atgtuttfeAt portion 6f this brief will demonstrate that the State's 
1
 First degree murder is now designated "aggravated murder." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1991). All references in this 
brief are to first degree murder as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-202 (1990), under which defendant was convicted. 
2 
petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be 
granted. 
ARGUMENT 
IN REVERSING DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF 
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER ON COUNT III, 
WHICH WAS BASED ON DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO 
KILL HER HUSBAND BY ADMINISTERING OXALIC ACID 
TO HIM, THE COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 76-4-101(3)(b) AND 76-5-202(1)(n) 
(1990) AND OVERLOOKED STATE V. PAPPAS, 707 
P.2D 1169 (UTAH 1989). 
In reversing defendant's conviction of attempted first 
degree murder on count III, the Court concluded that, although 
the State had proved at trial the requisite mental state and the 
requisite "substantial step" for attempted first degree murder, 
it had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "oxalic 
acid is a poison or a lethal substance" or to present sufficient 
evidence "as to the quantity of oxalic acid that would constitute 
a lethal dose, much less that [defendant] attempted to administer 
such an amount." Johnson, slip op. at 9. The Court rejected the 
State's argument that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(b) 
(1990) — which provides that no defense to an attempt crime 
arises "[d]ue to factual or legal impossibility if the offense 
could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as 
the actor believed them to be" — the prosecution was required to 
prove only that defendant believed that oxalic acid was a poison 
or a lethal substance, or that she was administering it in a 
lethal dose. Id. at 9-10. It stated that M[w]here the charge is 
attempted first degree murder, which is distinguishable under 
section 76-5-202(1) from attempted second degree murder only by 
3 
the presence of specified objective aggravating circumstances, 
the legislature must have intended that the aggravating 
circumstance actually be present." jDd. at 10. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court overlooked the 
basic policy considerations which underpin Utah's attempt statute 
and its rejection of the impossibility defense. The Court also 
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990) in the 
context of attempted first degree murder. 
The attempt statute, section 76-4-101, is derived from 
the Model Penal Code. State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 
1984) (per curiam); Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 5.01 (1985) 
(hereafter "MPC" )2. The MPC rejects the defense of 
impossibility "by providing that the defendant's conduct should 
be measured according to the circumstances as he believes them to 
be, rather than the circumstances as they may have existed in 
fact." MPC, art. 5, § 5.01 comment 3, at 307. Utah's criminal 
code likewise rejects the impossibility defense. The MPC 
criticizes the approach of some courts which find no attempt 
where, in light of the actual facts, it was impossible for the 
2
 Section 5.01 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the crime, he 
(a) purposely engages in conduct that 
would constitute the crime if the 
attendant circumstances were as he 
believes them to be[.] 
• • • • 
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defendant to commit the crime, Bven though the defendant fully 
intended to commit the crime: 
The primary rationale of these decisions 
is that, judging the actor's conduct in the 
light of the actual facts, what he intended 
to do did not amount to a crime. This 
approach, however, is unsound in that it 
seeks to evaluate a mental attitude—"intent 
or purpose"—not looking to the actor's 
mental frame of reference, but to a situation 
wholly at variance with the actor's beliefs. 
In so doing, the courts exonerate defendants 
in situations where attempt liability most 
certainly should be imposed. In all of these 
cases the actor's criminal purpose has been 
clearly demonstrated; he went as far as he 
could in implementing that purpose; and, as a 
result, his "dangerousness" is plainly 
manifested. 
Id. at 308-09 (footnote omitted). 
With respect to attempted murder, while "[s]ome early 
decisions exculpated the actor of attempted murder if the 
instrumentality selected was not adequate for committing the 
crime contemplated, . . . the general rule today is that one can 
be guilty of an attempt to murder although the gun or poison or 
bomb is incapable of producing death." Id., at 311-12 (footnotes 
omitted). See also LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 
S 6.3, at 42-43 (1986). 
As this Court noted in State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 
1172 (Utah 1985), "[m]odern criminal jurisprudence has a very 
clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent instead of simply 
punishing the manifest criminality or outwardly criminal act," 
and "[o]ur Legislature has expressed that its concern is directed 
more toward subjective criminality than toward manifest 
5 
criminality . • • •" The legislature's "desire to punish 
subjective criminality so long as it is linked with some 
otherwise harmless corroborative act that demonstrates the 
firmness of the actor's criminal resolve" is exemplified in 
section 76-4-101(3)(b)'s denial of an impossibility defense to an 
attempt charge. Pappas. 705 P.2d at 1172. In short, under 
Utah's attempt statute, which is derived from the MPC, the 
actor's subjective mental state is the primary determinant of 
criminal liability, and the level of punishment imposed depends 
on the degree of culpability associated with a particular mental 
state. 
With the foregoing principles of attempt law in mind, 
this Court's reversal of defendant's first degree murder 
conviction on count III can now be examined. First, the 
legislature has determined that an intentional or knowing killing 
accomplished by certain instrumentalities — i.e., poison 
(including "any lethal substance or . . . any substance 
administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity")3 or a 
bomb-like device — is first degree murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-202(1)(1) & (n) (1990). The intentional or knowing use of one 
of these intrumentalities to cause the death of another makes the 
murder a first degree murder rather than a second degree murder. 
For whatever reason, the legislature determined that the use of a 
3
 Throughout this brief, the State will generally use only 
the term "poison" to refer to a poison, a lethal substance, or 
any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or 
quantity (see § 76-5-202(1)(n)). 
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poison or a bomb to kill another is a more egregious form of 
murder. And, its obvious intent is to punish the actor who 
decides to use a poison or a bomb more severely than the actor 
who, for example, uses a gun or a knife to kill. 
That legislative intent seems equally obvious in the 
attempt context, where, although death does not result, the 
identical intent to use a poison or a bomb is present. 
Furthermore, under Utah's attempt statute, which rejects the 
impossibility defense, the fact that the substance administered 
is not actually a poison, or that the device is not actually a 
functional bomb capable of causing death, does not insulate from 
a higher degree of criminal liability the actor who believes the 
substance is a poison or the device is a functional bomb. This 
is so because Utah's statute seeks to punish subjective 
criminality, the actor's criminal mental state, not simply the 
outwardly criminal act. The actor who attempts to kill with what 
he mistakenly believes to be a poison or a bomb has a mental 
state as culpable as that of an actor who attempts to kill with 
something that is in fact a poison or a bomb. Indeed, beyond the 
mistaken belief as to the true character of the substance or 
device, each actor has precisely the seune mental state and thus 
is equally dangerous.4 
In the instant case, this Court concluded that a 
subjective mistake by the actor that the substance used in an 
4
 This is also the same culpable mental state possessed by 
the actor who succeeds in causing a death and is guilty of the 
completed crime of first degree murder. 
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attempt to kill was actually a poison or was administered in a 
lethal dose "would be a defense to a charge of attempted first 
degree murder•" Johnson, slip op. at 10. This conclusion 
overlooks the principle that the primary determinant of attempt 
liability is the actor's subjective mental state. It also 
overlooks the clear distinction in culpability the legislature 
has drawn between the actor who intends to kill by administering 
poison to another and the actor who intends to kill by using some 
other instrumentality. Because the mental state of the actor who 
attempts to kill with what he mistakenly believes is poison is as 
culpable as the mental state of the actor who attempts to kill 
with what is in fact poison (i.e., both intend to use poison to 
cause the death of another), this Court has no basis for 
concluding that "where the charge is attempted first degree 
murder, which is distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from 
attempted second degree murder only by the presence of specified 
objective aggravating circumstances, the legislature must have 
intended that the aggravating circumstance actually be present." 
Johnson, slip op. at 10. That conclusion is inconsistent with 
the attempt statute's focus on subjective criminality and the 
legislature's decision to designate murder by poison as first 
degree murder. The net result of the Court's holding is a 
nullification of section 76-4-101(3)(b) for purposes of attempted 
first degree murder under section 76-5-202(1)(n), and an 
elimination of the critical distinction between the actor who 
intends to kill by poison and the actor who intends to kill by 
8 
some other instrumentality the legislature has segregated out 
I:or ibfjM»i ;;,ic"iI t r e a t m e n t * •" 
impossibility defense in the face of a statute which explicitly 
rejects that defense and the absence of any Indication that 
the legislate ire i ntended : , . statute in i in apply i fcieuiiun 
76-5-202(1)(n) ThIs Is contrary to the well established 
principles that the Court's "primary responsibility in construing 
legislative enactments is to give effec t to the legislature's 
underlying intent" State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 
II 4 H I ) ( i : j 1 a 1 1 1 1 in in • DIII i I in in! I I I I 1 1 e u i < I e n c <' o f I I m 
legislature's true i • and purpose .H the plain language .  
the statute, Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 p.2d 
ill:)03 906 (1 1 1: i i i 1 I 11 98 1) See a lso State v. Bishoi 9 , 
495 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman,. I! , concurring i n the result) 
(relying language of statute to conclude that 
legislature intended a bifurcated procedure under version 
section 76-5-404.1(3)(g)). 
Accordingly, the Court shoi rehear inq ai ij 
reinstate defendant's convictioi first degree murder on count 
III, with the recognition that, to establish guilt of attempted 
f i r s I:, degree 
the State needed to prove only that defendant believed the oxalic 
acid she administered her husband was either a poison or given 
hi f J" e c o iiei e> »' i deinm,:e c" I! e a i; I \ » s uf >po r L s ) . 
For the reasons discussed above, the impossibility defense cannot 
operate to convert defendant's attempted first degree murder 
9 
conviction to an attempted second degree murder conviction. 
Utah's attempt and first degree murder statutes, and the 
underlying legislative intent, simply do not allow for such a 
result, 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant 
rehearing and modify its opinion to confonri to Utah law. Utah R. 
App. P. 35(c). 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. ** . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /£^5ay of November, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON ff 
Assistant Attorney General 
CHARLENK BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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State of Utal : No. 900088 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
r JL u c D 
Novembe: ] , 1 991 
Pegr , uohnson, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
First District, Box Elder County 
The Honorable Franklin L. Gunnel! 
Attorneys p. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, 
for the State 
Ronald J. Yengich, Salt Lake City, for Johnson 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Peggy B. Johnson was charged with three 
separate counts of attempted first degree murder of her 
husband, Danny Johnson, and one count of distribution ^ a 
controlled substance for value. With respect to the 
attempted murder charges, count I charged an attempt \ 
heroin to cause her husband's death, and counts II and III 
charged attempts to use, respectively, amphetamines and 
oxalic acid to achieve the same end. Johnson was found 
guilty on all three counts and was also found guilty of 
distribution of a controlled substance for value. She was 
sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of five years to 
life. Johnson appeals from the three attempted murder 
convictions but does not appeal from the distribution 
conviction. We affirm the attempted first degree murder 
conviction on count I, based on the administration of 
heroin. We reverse the conviction on count III, based on the 
administration of oxalic acid, but find sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction of attempted second degree murder on 
that count. We reverse the conviction on count IT. whirh is 
grounded on the administration of amphetamines. 
On appeal, we view the record facts in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, £&£, e.g.. State v. v^rd*. 
770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985), and we recite the facts accordingly. 
Prior to her convictions, Peggy Johnson owned The 
Shack, a bar in Willard, Utah. She also worked as a bail 
bondswoman and 3 constable. In approximately 1982, Johnson 
met Cindy Orozco when she bailed Orozco out of the Box Elder 
County jail. Johnson and Orozco had various other contacts, 
at least one of which involved Johnson's bailing Orozco out 
of jail a second time. Orozco apparently never fully paid 
Johnson for her bail bond services. 
In December 1987, Johnson contacted Orozco to talk 
about how Orozco could recover a guitar and stereo that 
Orozco's husband Richard (nicknamed Penny), had given Johnson 
as collateral for a bail bond. Later in December, Johnson 
met with Cindy and Penny Orozco. At trial, Cindy Orozco 
testified that during this meeting Johnson indicated a desire 
to "get rid of her husband" because they were having 
problems. Johnson asked the Orozcos if they knew of a drug 
on which a person could overdose. 
Johnson again met with Cindy and Penny Orozco in 
early January 1988. Johnson told Cindy that Danny had been 
beating her, that he had a girlfriend, and that she was under 
a lot of stress. Johnson further explained that she did not 
want to divorce her husband because he would get half of her 
inheritance. Cindy testified that Johnson had concluded that 
the easiest way to get rid of Danny was to "overdose him." 
To that end, Johnson wanted the Orozcos to provide her with 
heroin. Cindy Orozco told Johnson that it would cost $300 to 
purchase enough heroin to cause an overdose. The Orozcos and 
Johnson then went to procure the drug. After dropping Penny 
and Johnson off at a bar, Cindy Orozco attempted to buy the 
heroin, but was unable to do so at the time. The Orozcos 
eventually used the $300 to purchase cocaine for their own 
use. 
During the following week, after Cindy Orozco 
admitted to Johnson that she had used the money to purchase 
drugs for herself, Johnson continued to seek Cindy's 
assistance in obtaining drugs to administer to her husband. 
Although Cindy was somewhat hesitant, she agreed to provide 
Johnson with drugs after Johnson brought her daughter to the 
Orozcos* house and had her describe her father's abuse of her 
mother. 
On or about January 21, 1988, Johnson gave Orozco an 
additional $450 to buy heroin. Orozco purchased the heroin 
and gave it to Johnson. Three days later, Orozco went to 
Johnson's house to borrow some money to purchase drugs for 
her husband, Penny. Johnson told Orozco that she could not 
lend her any money because Danny would get upset. During 
this conversation, Orozco testified that Johnson then told 
her that the "stuff [indicating the heroin] didn't work." 
No. 900088 2 
i)iI January 27, 1988, Orozco met with Officer Marci 
Vaughn of the Ogden Police Department and offered to help 
"make a drug bust* in return for leniency on a theft charge. 
Officer Vaughn confronted Orozco with information she had 
learned from Orozco's parole officer concerning statements 
Orozco had made about Johnson's apparent attempt to kill her 
husband. Orozco then agreed to cooperate with Officer Steve 
Vojtecky of the Utah Division of Investigations in his 
investigation of the allegations against Johnson, 
On January 28, 1988, at Officer Vojtecky's direction, 
Orozco telephoned Johnson at The Shack, Officers recorded 
the conversation. Johnson told Orozco she had a "new idea" 
but that she could not talk about it in her husband's 
presence. Later the same day, Orozco called Johnson at her 
home, but Johnson refused to talk about the "new idea" over 
the phone. 
The next day, uto^co went to Johnson's house wearing 
a body microphone. Officer Vojtecky recorded the conversation 
from outside the house. During this conversation, Johnson 
asked if Orozco knew where to get some "crank"—a street name 
for methamphetamine, Johnson explained that she had seen a 
television program that indicated that a person could be 
killed by taking too much crank. Johnson then told Orozco 
that she had administered various other substances to her 
husband, a! ] of whi ch had. failed to kill him,.. 1 
1. The transcript of the recorded conversation, which was 
introduced at trial, provides in part: 
Johnson: (inaudible) I can't believe all 
this shit hasn't done anything. 
•Orozco: Well, what all what all 
have you like tried and stuff ? 
Johnson: rhat that I got from you. 
Orozco: f'eah 
Johnson: And amoi i mox I 11 . . . 
acid • . * 
Orozco: Amoxlic acid? 
Johnson: Uh-huh. A whole botti *--
Orozco: A whole bottle of it? 
Johnson: Sfou know, he's been taking the 
capsules . . . about that much 
every day. Tried a whole thing 
for thirty days and uh-huh. 
Decon. Didn't work. And this 
stuff. Looked it up here in the 
encyclopedia. 
Orozco: How do you pronounce it? 
Johnson: Oxalic. Oxalic. 
Orozco: Hmmm. He's ??? Tricky. 
Johnson: "—•-
( t ' ( i n I i i nn . 1 " ! ! i in |idiMijitj "III ]i 
3 No. 900088 
After Orozco left the house/ Vojtecky requested that 
she go back and ask Johnson for money to buy the crank and to 
explain how she intended to administer the drug. In response 
to Orozco-s inquiry, Johnson replied that she planned to put 
it in capsules. In a telephone conversation the same day, 
Johnson agreed to meet Orozco at Orozco's house and to bring 
money for the crank. On January 30, 1988, Johnson arrived at 
the house and spoke with Orozcor who was once again wearing a 
body microphone, and Vojtecky, who was acting as Orozco's 
boyfriend. During this conversation, Johnson asked how she 
should administer the crank and inquired whether she could put 
it in her husband's coffee. Johnson explained that she 
planned to administer it to him in this manner one night when 
he came home. Vojtecky informed her that the crank would kill 
him and asked if that's what she wanted. Johnson replied, 
••This sounds horrible, but yes.w Johnson then gave Vojtecky 
$500 to purchase the crank. 
Also during this conversation, Johnson discussed her 
prior attempts to poison her husband. She told Vojtecky that 
she had already used most of a bottle of oxalic acid in her 
husband's capsules over the previous month and that he was 
still taking capsules containing oxalic acid everyday. She 
stated that she gave her husband an entire box of Decon in 
capsules that he had taken over a one-month period. She 
further explained how she had put the heroin in a capsule on 
January 21 and given it to her husband personally. She 
explained that none of these attempts had worked. 
Later that evening, Vojtecky and Orozco met Johnson 
in Willard, Utah, and gave her some counterfeit crank made of 
brown sugar and flour. Vojtecky testified that Johnson 
(Footnote 1 continued.) 
Orozco: I know. I can see that. And 
it's . . . it's crystal? 
Johnson: Yeah. 
Orozco: What do they usually use it for? 
Johnson: Taking the paint off (inaudible)• 
Orozco: Takin' the what? 
Johnson: Paint off metal. 
Orozco: Off metal? 
Johnson: Yeah. 
Orozco: Hmmm. So crank, huh? Well, I 
don't know. I guess I could 
probably get back with ya. I 
might . • . I maybe can, you 
know, know someone. 
Johnson: I don't think coke will do it. 
I don't think he'd do enough of 
that. And if you could get 
heroin liquid and everything, 
how much would that take? 
No. 900088 4 
appeared to put the counterfeit crank under her dashboard. 
When other officers stopped Johnson's car a short time later, 
however, they were unabl e to find any of the substance. 
AL trial, the State produced evidence that supported 
this version of the facts. Specifically, subsequent tests 
performed on the capsules that Danny ingested showed that 
they contained the same substance as the bottle in the 
Johnson home labeled "oxalic acid.* Danny Johnson testified 
at trial that he had been taking the capsules for a month and 
that he had noticed stomach cramps, weakness, and a burning 
sensation in his throat on at least one occasion after taking 
a pill. Danny also testified that his wife had given him a 
capsule before he went to bed on the night of January 21, the 
same night:, according to his wife's statement to the 
undercover officer, that she had put heroin in his capsules 
He testified that he awoke at approximately 6 a.m. with 
stomach discomfort and dizziness. He also testified that he 
had broken out in a cold sweat and that he vomited the 
morning after taking the capsules. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three 
counts of attempted first degree murder. Each count alleged 
that Johnson attempted to cause the death of her husband 
through the administration of poison or a lethal substance or 
a substance in a lethal amount for the purpose of pecuniary 
or other personal gain. The jury also convicted Johnson on a 
fourth count of distribution of a controlled substance for 
value. After trial, Johnson retained new counsel, who 
immediately filed a motion for a new trial. The court denied 
the motion, and this appeal followed. 
Johnson challenges her conviction wn «xA ;^ * 
counts of attempted first degree murder, relying on two 
grounds. First, she contends that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. Second, she 
claims that statements she made to the Orozcos and the 
undercover investigators concerning the alleged crimes were 
admitted improperly because the State had failed first to 
show independent evidence of a corpus delicti. See State v. 
Weidon, 6 I Itah 2d 372, 31 4 P 2d 353 (] 957) 
We first consider the insufficiency of t:l le evidence 
claims as to each count. The appropriate standard of review 
is as follows: 
In considering a claim of insufficiency of 
the evidence, "we review the evidence and 
all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a 
jury conviction for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficientlv inconclusive or inherently 
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improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
[or she] was convicted." 
State v, Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). We note that the 
trial court considered defendants insufficiency of the 
evidence claim in denying the motion for a new trial. This 
action lends further weight to the jury's verdict. See 
generally State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) 
(acknowledging that trial court has discretion in granting or 
denying motions for new trials in criminal cases); State v. 
Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 561, 6 P.2d 167, 169 (1931); State v. 
Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 116, 272 P. 635, 639 (1928). 
Moving to the merits of the sufficiency challenges, 
the elements of the crime charged are drawn from two statutes, 
the attempt statute and the first degree murder statute. To 
be guilty of an attempt, the actor must engage "in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the 
offense" with the mental state -otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) 
(1990).2 To be guilty of first degree (or capital) murder, 
the actor must commit what would otherwise be a second degree 
murder, i.e., "intentionally or knowingly" cause the death of 
another, and in addition, must do so under circumstances where 
at least one of several aggravating factors listed in the 
statute is shown to be present. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
2. The attempt statute provides: 
(1) For purposes of this part a 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he [or she] 
engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, 
conduct does not constitute a substantial 
step unless it is strongly corroborative 
of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of 
attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have 
been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990). 
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(1990). Here, the State relied on two of the listed 
aggravating factors: first, the commission of a homicide "by 
means of the administration of a poison or of any lethal 
substance or of any substance administered in a lethal 
amount/ dosage, or quantity," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990), and second, the commission of a 
homicide "for pecuniary or other personal gain." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(f) (1990). 
To summarize, in order to convict Peggy Johnson of 
attempted first degree murder, the State had the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (i) she had 
the intent to kill or knowledge that her acts would result in 
death if carried out; (ii) she engaged in conduct constituting 
a substantial step toward causing the death of her husband, 
and (iii) she did so either (a) by administering or attempting 
to administer a "poison . . . or lethal substance or . . . 
[a] substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or 
quantity" or (b) "for pecuniary or other personal gain." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1990); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1)(n); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f); £££ 
State v. Castonouav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1983). We 
will consider Johnson's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge 
to her convictions on each of the three counts separately. 
We first address count II. That count alleges that 
Johnson attempted to cause her husband's death by administer-
ing methamphetamines. We assume, without deciding, that 
evidence of the requisite intent to kill is present. 
However, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence for 
a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson's 
actions amounted to a "substantial step" toward commission of 
first degree murder by administration of methamphetamine. 
The State argues that Johnson's giving $500 to 
Vojtecky to purchase the counterfeit crank constitutes a 
"substantial step" toward commission of the crime. We 
disagree. In order for conduct to constitute a substantial 
step, there must be more than mere preparation. See State v. 
Castongugy/ 663 P.2d at 1326; State v. Otto, 629 P.2d 646, 
647 (Idaho 1981). All that is shown from the record is that 
Johnson purchased counterfeit crank from undercover 
officers. There is no showing that she attempted to 
administer the substance. Indeed, there is no evidence as to 
what she did or attempted to do with it. She may have used 
it herself or simply disposed of it. When the police pulled 
her car over after she purchased the "crank," officers did 
not find any counterfeit crank in her car or on her person. 
The mere purchase of the counterfeit crank from an undercover 
officer does not go beyond preparation and therefore is not 
the substantial step needed to support a conviction for 
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attempted first degree murder. See Otto. €29 P.2d at 650 
(solicitation of hit man not substantial step).3 
Because there is insufficient evidence to support a 
rinding of substantial step on count II, there is no need for 
us to consider the evidence regarding either of the charged 
aggravating circumstances that would elevate the attempted 
second degree murder charge to a first. We reverse Johnson's 
conviction under count II. 
Johnson also challenges her conviction under count 
III, which alleges that she attempted to kill her husband by 
administering oxalic acid. As with count II, the State must 
have proven the requisite mental state, the requisite 
conduct, and the requisite aggravating circumstance. As to 
the first element, there is sufficient evidence to show that 
Johnson had the requisite state of mind. Johnson indicated 
to Orozco that she had given her husband an entire bottle of 
oxalic acid in small doses in his ampicillin capsules. 
Johnson made this statement during a conversation with Orozco 
in which they were discussing how large a dose of heroin 
would be fatal.4 The jury could certainly infer from these 
statements and others that Johnson had made about failed 
attempts to poison her husband that Johnson administered the 
oxalic acid with the necessary intent or knowledge. 
As for the second element of the attempt charge, the 
question is whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
the jury's finding that Johnson's conduct constituted a 
substantial step toward the commission of murder. There is 
no question that there was evidence sufficient to show that 
Johnson actually administered the oxalic acid to her 
husband. Johnson's statements about giving her husband an 
3. The fact that the counterfeit crank was harmless does not 
figure in our determination that its purchase failed to 
establish a substantial step toward the commission of the 
crime. Indeed, as the State points out, impossibility is no 
defense to an attempt in Utah. Section 76-4-101(3)(b) 
provides: 
(3) No defense to the offense of 
attempt shall arise: 
. . . . 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have 
been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(b) (1990). 
4. As discussed later in this opinion, we conclude that there 
is sufficient evidence apart from these statements to satisfy 
the corpus delicti rule, and therefore, the statements were 
admitted properly. 
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entire bottle of the substance in his ampicillin capsules was 
corroborated by the officers' discovery of oxalic acid under 
the sink at her home and tests run on the ampicillin capsules 
that showed them to contain oxalic acid. That fact is 
sufficient to support a finding of the conduct element of an 
attempted intentional killing.* 
The final issue to be addressed is the sufficiency 
of the evidence of the aggravating circumstances necessary to 
raise the murder attempted from second degree to first. The 
aggravating circumstances charged were (i) attempting to kill 
by administration of oxalic acid, which was either (a) a 
"poison" or "a lethal substance" or (b) "a substance 
administered in a lethal amount, dosage or quantity," or 
(ii) attempting to kill "for the purpose of pecuniary or 
other personal gain." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(n); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f) (1990). We will deal first with 
the two-fold issue presented by the oxalic acid. We then 
will address the personal gain issue. 
Respecting the oxalic acid, the State did not prove 
the first of the so-called poison alternatives, i.e., it did 
not demonstrate that oxalic acid is a poison or a lethal 
substance. There was evidence that oxalic acid in some 
unspecified amount may kill, but there was also evidence that 
oxalic acid is produced naturally by the body in small 
amounts. This state of the evidence is insufficient to 
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that oxalic acid 
is a poison or a lethal substance. 
The State's second poison alternative was to prove 
that the oxalic acid was administered or attempted to be 
administered in a "lethal amount, dosage, or quantity." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(n). The problem with the State's case 
is that there was no showing at trial as to the quantity of 
oxalic acid that would constitute a lethal dose, much less 
that Johnson attempted to administer such an amount. 
The State responds that under the attempt statute, 
failure to demonstrate the lethality of the dosage of oxalic 
acid administered or attempted to be administered cannot bar 
a conviction for an attempted first degree murder. The State 
relies on section 76-4-101(3)(b), which provides that no 
defense to a prosecution for attempt arises "[d]ue to factual 
or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor 
believed them to be." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3) (b) 
5. The fact that impossibility is not a defense under section 
76-4-101(3) permits us to find the evidence of a substantial 
step sufficient without requiring us to probe into whether 
oxalic acid, in the amounts intended to be administered, would 
have proven fatal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3) (1990). 
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(1990). We agree that under this statute factual impos-
sibility generally is no defense to an attempt charge. 
However, where the charge is attempted first degree murder, 
which is distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from 
attempted second degree murder only by the presence of 
specified objective aggravating circumstances/ the 
legislature must have intended that the aggravating 
circumstance actually be present. Therefore, a subjective 
mistake by the actor as to the presence of an aggravating 
circumstance required by section 76-5-202(1) would be a 
defense to a charge of attempted first degree murder. Under 
such circumstances, the actor can be convicted only of an 
attempted intentional killing—attempted second degree murder. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that because the 
State failed to prove either that oxalic acid is a poison or 
a lethal substance or that Johnson administered or attempted 
to administer a quantity of the acid that would have been 
lethal, a conviction for attempted first degree murder could 
not be supported on the basis of proof of the aggravating 
circumstances described in section 76-5-202(1)(n). 
This leaves us with the second aggravating 
circumstance charged, attempting to kill "for the purpose 
of pecuniary or other personal gain." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1)(f). However, before we consider the 
sufficiency of the evidence on that issue, we are confronted 
with a problem. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 
attempted first degree murder charge without specifying the 
aggravating circumstance upon which the verdict was based, 
even though it was submitted to the jury on both charged 
aggravating circumstances. There is evidence of a motive of 
pecuniary gain on Johnson's part. Specifically, there was 
testimony that Johnson had wanted to divorce her husband for 
two years prior to her arrest but was afraid to do so because 
she thought that if she did, he would get half of the 
inheritance she received from her father. A motive to 
deprive another of what the law might award him or her in the 
event of a divorce seems sufficient to make out a case for 
application of section 76-5-202(1)(f). One might argue that 
we should affirm the attempted first degree murder verdict if 
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt 
under either of the aggravating circumstances therein 
presented. fi££. State Vt Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 565-68 (Utah 
1987) (Hall, C.J., plurality opinion). We conclude, however, 
that such an avenue is not open to us here. 
In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so 
long as there is one legally valid theory among those upon 
which the case went to the jury and sufficient evidence to 
support a verdict on that theory. £££ Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. 
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241-42 (Utah 1987). However, in a 
criminal case the rule is to the contrary. A majority of 
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this court has stated that a jury must be unanimous on all 
elements of a criminal charge for the conviction to stand. 
See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 585-88 (Durham, J., concurring & 
dissenting); id. at 591 (Zimmerman, J., concurring & 
dissenting); id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). From this premise, it follows that a general 
verdict of guilty cannot stand if the State's case was 
premised on more than one factual or legal theory of the 
elements of the crime and any one of those theories is flawed 
or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In such 
circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether the jury 
agreed unanimously on all of the elements of a valid and 
evidentially supported theory of the elements of the crime. 
In the present case, the jury returned a general 
verdict of guilty on each count of attempted first degree 
murder. No special verdicts were given that would indicate 
upon which aggravating circumstance the jury based the 
conviction. Because we cannot determine whether the jury was 
unanimous on the elements of the offense based on section 
76-5-202(1)(f) alone, the insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the State's proof of the section 76-5-202(1)(n) 
aggravating circumstance makes it impossible for us to affirm 
on the alternative pecuniary gain theory. Therefore, we must 
reverse the attempted first degree murder conviction on count 
III. 
That does not end the matter, however. Section 
76-1-402(5) of the Code allows an appellate court to enter a 
conviction for a lesser included offense under certain 
circumstances. That section provides that if 
there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but 
. . . there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included 
offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
found every fact required for conviction of 
that included offense, the verdict . . . 
may be . . . reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1990). Although technically 
Johnson did not seek to reduce the sentence from attempted 
first degree murder to the lesser included offense on appeal, 
we deem the requirements of the statute satisfied because she 
requested that the jury be given a lesser included instruction 
and she attacks the conviction for attempted first degree 
murder on appeal. She therefore can claim no surprise at 
this court's consideration of a lesser included offense. 
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In the present casef the only basis we rely upon for 
overturning the attempted first degree murder conviction is a 
lack of evidence on the aggravating circumstances charged. 
However, the other elements of the attempted first degree 
murder charge under count III, for which we found ample 
evidence to support the verdict of guilt, are identical to 
the elements of the lesser included charge of attempted 
second degree murder. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
(1990) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) (1990) (amended 
1991). The fact that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain that verdict as to the aggravating circumstance in no 
way undermines the finding of the elements necessary for 
attempted second degree murder. We therefore direct the 
trial court to enter a judgment of conviction for that 
offense on count III.6 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) 
(1990); State v. Bolsinaer. 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) 
(plurality opinion); State v, PinflfUP, 655 P.2d 674, 676 
(Utah 1982). 
We now consider Johnson's challenges to her 
conviction under count I, which charged her with attempting 
to cause the death of her husband by the administration of 
heroin. Here, again, the State was required to prove the 
same elements: (i) intent or knowledge; (ii) conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward the killing; and 
(iii) an aggravating circumstance, either (a) that the 
attempt was by the administration of a poison or a substance 
in a lethal amount or (b) that the attempt was for the 
purpose of pecuniary or other personal gain. We find the 
evidence sufficient to support the juryfs verdict. 
There is ample evidence to support the jury's 
verdict that Johnson intended to kill her husband or had 
knowledge that her actions, if successful, would result in 
death to satisfy the mental element. For example, the 
evidence showed that Johnson asked Orozco if she knew of a 
drug that could ••overdose someone.H After finding such a 
drug, Johnson wanted to obtain a sufficient amount to achieve 
6. This case is distinguishable from State v. Bolsinaer, 699 
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), where the court vacated a conviction 
for second degree murder and entered a conviction for 
manslaughter, an offense that requires a wholly different 
mental state. In his separate concurring and dissenting 
opinion in that case, Justice Stewart expressed concern that 
section 76-1-402(5) would be misapplied if used to enter a 
conviction for a lesser included offense that required a 
different mens rea than the charged crime. See Bolsinaer, 699 
P.2d at 1221 (Stewart, J., concurring & dissenting). No such 
situation is present here. The mens rea required for the 
lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder is 
either identical to or included within that required for 
attempted first degree murder. 
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the desired result. To that end, she gave Orozco money on 
two separate occasions to purchase the required heroin. From 
these facts, the jury could reasonably find that Johnson had 
the requisite mental state. 
There was also evidence that Johnson engaged in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of 
the crime. In addition to supplying the money to purchase 
the drug, Johnson told Vojtecky that she had chopped up the 
heroin and given it to her husband in his capsules. There 
was confirmatory testimony by her husband that he actually 
had taken the heroin-filled capsules. Johnson later admitted 
to Orozco that even after giving her husband the heroin, "the 
stuff didn't work." 
As for proof of the necessary aggravating 
circumstance, defense counsel conceded during oral argument 
that the administration of the heroin was sufficient to bring 
the case within the "poison" or "lethal amount, dosage or 
quantity" language of section 76-5-202(n). Additionally, the 
evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary 
or other personal gain is sufficient for the same reasons 
stated with regard to count III. Therefore, there was ample 
evidence to support the finding of guilty on count I. 
As a second line of attack, Johnson argues that the 
State failed to make a prima facie showing of the corpus 
delicti necessary to admit her incriminating statements. 
Absent the admission of her statements prior to her arrest, 
she claims, there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for first degree murder. 
We first consider the timeliness of the raising of 
this issue. Trial counsel failed to preserve this by 
objecting to the admission of the statements in a timely 
manner. Current counsel first raised the claim in a motion 
for a new trial. At that time, the State argued that 
counsel's failure to raise the issue earlier waived the 
claim. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). However, in disposing 
of the new trial motion, the trial judge did not rely on 
waiver, but addressed the merits of the issue. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-24 (1982) (repealed 1989) (current version at 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24). In its order denying the motion, the 
court found that Johnson's statements did not fall within the 
purview of the corpus delicti rule because the statements 
were part of the crime, not confessions: 
The State v» Welflon case cited by 
Defendant (314 P.2d 353) does not extend 
the Corpus Delecti [sic] Rule as it 
relates to confessions made by the 
Defendant to all statements made by the 
Defendant. In this case, the now objected 
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to statements **ere wade in connection with 
the activity itself, not after arrest and 
were not introduced in the form of a 
confession but to show -a motive and intent 
at the time other actions were taking 
place. It is the judgment of this Court 
that such statements are admissible as 
part of the case in chief and may be used 
to show Corpus Delecti [sic]. 
Because the trial court addressed the corpus delicti issue 
fully and did not rely on waiver, we consider the issue on 
appeal, even though trial counsel failed to properly preserve 
it as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1). See State 
v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). But see State 
v. Belaard, 811 P.2d 211, 217 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, 
granted. One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver 
rules like rule 103(a)(1) is to assure that the trial court 
has the first opportunity to address a claim that it erred. 
If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the 
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened 
considerably. 
Some might argue that our refusal to find waiver 
under these circumstances will give defense counsel a 
tactical advantage because they can withhold an objection at 
trial and, in the event of an adverse result, still challenge 
the admissibility of the evidence in a motion for a new 
trial, thus preserving the opportunity to appeal. A clear 
understanding of such a tactic points out its perilousness. 
For example, the trial court may refuse to consider the 
merits of the argument on the motion for new trial because it 
may find the issue waived. If so, the issue can be 
considered on appeal only if the appellate court concludes 
that the admission of the evidence was plain error. State v. 
Verde, 770 p.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989); State vt Bullock, 791 
p.2d 155, 158 (1989), certt denied, U.S. , 110 s. ct. 
3270 (1990). 
Turning to the merits, the State makes two 
arguments. First, it contends, as the trial court apparently 
found, that the corpus delicti rule does not apply to 
Johnson's statements because they were made during the 
commission of a crime. The State would limit the doctrine's 
application to post-crime or post-arrest statements or to 
statements made when a defendant knows he or she is the focus 
of an investigation. Alternatively, the State argues that 
even if the corpus delicti rule applies here, it is satisfied 
if the court adopts a -trustworthiness- standard as to 
evidence of corpus delicti. We will address both of these 
arguments. 
Initially, we note that the trial court's ruling 
that the corpus delicti rule does not bar admission of the 
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statements is a question of law, and accordingly, our 
standard of review is correctness. E.g., Rollins v. 
Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital 
Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). We also note 
that because we have reversed the entire conviction on count 
II, we consider the corpus delicti question only with respect 
to counts I and III. 
Our analysis begins with a definition of the corpus 
delicti rule and an overview of its scope and operation. The 
corpus delicti rule states that before a defendant's 
inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence against 
the defendant, the State must prove the occurrence of a 
crime, i.e., a corpus delicti. State v. Johnson. 95 Utah 
572, 579-80, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1938), overruled on other 
grounds. State v. Crank. 105 Utah 332, 355, 142 P.2d 178, 188 
(1943). Although the rule traditionally concerns 
after-the-fact confessions, the policy underlying the rule's 
application is equally applicable to admissions because they 
are subject to the same possibilities for error.7 See 
Opper v. United States. 348 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1954). The rule 
is designed as a "safeguard against convicting the innocent 
on the strength of false confessions.** State v. Weldon, 6 
Utah 2d 372, 373, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (1957); see also Citv of 
Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash. 2d 569, 576, 723 P.2d 1135, 
1139 (1986). 
Corpus delicti must be established through evidence, 
independent of the confession or admission, that "the injury 
specified . . . occurred, and that such injury was caused by 
someone's criminal conduct."8 State v. Knoefler. 563 P.2d 
175, 176 (Utah 1977); see also State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d 
39, 41 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson. 95 Utah at 580-81, 83 
7. A confession, as is it is generally understood, is an 
"express acknowledgment by a defendant of his [or her] guilt 
of the crime with which he [or she] is charged." 29 Am. Jur. 
2d Evidence § 523 (1967). An admission, on the other hand, 
is an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance from which 
guilt may be inferred. Although confessions are also 
admissions, they are special types of admissions because they 
contain admissions of the criminal act itself and not mere 
admissions upon which guilt may be inferred. Id.; see State 
v. Karumai. 101 Utah 592, 601, 126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942) 
(recognizing the distinction between confessions and 
admissions). 
8. We note that some confusion has arisen surrounding corpus 
delicti because the term has more than one use. This case 
involves the question of when proof of the crime is required 
to allow introduction of a defendant's confession. In another 
context, corpus delicti refers to evidence that the crime was 
committed. £££ State v. Rebeterano. 681 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 
(Utah 1984). 
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P.2d at 1014-15. Our past cases have consistently required 
that the independent evidence show two things: (i) *[t]hat a 
wrong, an injury, or a damage has been done," and (ii) -that 
such was effected by a criminal agency, i.e., without right 
or by unlawful means.- Johnson, 95 Utah at 580, 83 P.2d at 
1014. Under our prior cases, the State is not required to 
show independent evidence -that the accused was the guilty 
agent.- £££, £^^, Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41; Knoefler, 563 
P.2d at 176; Weldon, 6 Utah 2d at 376-77, 314 P.2d at 356 
(1957); State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 372, 275 P.2d 173, 173 
(1954); Johnson, 95 Utah at 580, 83 P.2d at 1040. 
We first address the Statefs argument that the 
corpus delicti rule does not extend to Johnson*s statements 
because they were not -confessions- in the normal sense of 
the term since they occurred during the commission of the 
crimes charged. A number of federal and state courts 
addressing this issue have concluded that the corpus delicti 
rule is inapplicable to statements made prior to or during 
the commission of a crime. In Warszower v. United States, 
312 U.S. 342 (1941), the Supreme Court concluded that 
statements made prior to the commission of a crime did not 
-contain [any] of the inherent weaknesses of confessions or 
admissions after the fact- and, therefore, the corpus delicti 
doctrine1s requirement of corroboration was not necessary. 
Id. at 347. This position was confirmed in Opper v. United 
States, 348 U.S. at 90, 91. See 9lS0 Castillo v. State, 614 
P.2d 756, 759 (Alaska 1980); State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 
1373, 1382, 44 N.W.2d 24, 28-29 (1950); State v. Libbv. 546 
A.2d 444, 451 n.6 (Me. 1988); People v. Hamp, 110 Mich. App. 
92, 97, 312 N.W.2d 175, 178 (1981). Because this appears to 
be the majority position and supported by sound policy, we 
follow this approach in this case. Whatever the rule as to 
the need for caution in admitting inculpatory statements made 
after the crime, there seems little need for extraordinary 
protective measures for statements made before or during the 
crime's commission. 
Before we begin our corpus delicti analysis of the 
evidence on counts I and III, we must first address the 
quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the corpus delicti rule 
and serve as a predicate for the admission of precrime 
inculpatory statements. This should help us to determine the 
harmfulness of any trial court error in the admission of 
precrime inculpatory statements before the independent 
evidentiary foundation was laid. 
The precise quantum of independent evidence 
necessary to satisfy the Utah corpus delicti rule is somewhat 
unclear because of inconsistent statements of the standard in 
our prior cases. See State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d at 376, 314 
P.2d at 357; State v. Ferrv, 2 Utah 2d at 372, 275 P.2d at 
173 n.2; State vf Johnson, 95 Utah at 579, 83 p.2d at 1016; 
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State v. Wells. 35 Utah 400, 409, 100 P. 681, 684-85 (1909), 
overruled on other grounds. State v. Crank, 105 Utah at 352, 
142 P.2d at 187. Our initial statements of the standard 
required that the independent evidence prove the corpus 
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wells, 35 Utah 
at 409, 100 P. at 684. Over time, this standard has been 
softened, but it is difficult to determine precisely how much. 
In State v. Johnson, 95 Utah at 581, 83 P.2d at 
1016, we held that the independent corroborative evidence of 
the corpus delicti need only be consistent with and tend to 
"confirm and strengthen the confession." Id. at 583, 83 P.2d 
at 1016. Although this weakened the standard of Wells, it 
did not fix the new standard with any degree of certainty. 
We attempted to clarify the matter in State v. Ferrv, 2 Utah 
2d at 372, 275 P.2d at 173, when we held that evidence of the 
corpus delicti must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. However, this apparently clear standard was 
questioned only three years later in State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 
2d at 377, 314 P.2d at 356. In Weldon. the opinion of the 
majority of the court observed in dictum that the clear and 
convincing standard of Ferrv was a more stringent burden than 
was required by the purposes underlying the rule and that it 
might produce results unduly favorable to defendants. Id. 
However, notwithstanding the Weldon majority's criticism of 
the Ferrv standard, it recognized that Ferry stated the 
applicable standard and required a finding of clear and 
convincing evidence of corpus delicti. Id. at 377, 314 P.2d 
at 357. It then analyzed the evidence under that standard 
and found that the standard was not met. 
The State argues that the dicta in Weldon and the 
lack of reference to Ferry and its standard in other 
post-Ferry cases suggest that we have abandoned the clear and 
convincing standard and moved towards a softer 
"trustworthiness" standard. See, e.g., State v. Petree. 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); State v. Cazier. 521 P.2d 554, 555 
(Utah 1974); State v. Weldon, 6 Utah at 377, 314 P.2d at 
354. As noted above, however, only dicta in Weldon supports 
the State's argument. Other cases relied upon by the State 
do little to bolster its position. For example, although 
language in Cazier arguably phrases the standard in softer 
terms than Ferry, it is clear from the opinion that the 
evidence was sufficient to meet the clear and convincing 
standard of Ferry. Finally, any reliance on Petree is 
misplaced because it deals with the proof of "corpus delicti" 
in the context of an examination into the sufficiency of 
circumstantial evidence to support a guilty verdict on a 
murder charge and not the independent evidence needed to 
satisfy the corpus delicti rule on the admission of postcrime 
inculpatory statements. See Petree, 659 P.2d at 447. 
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In summary, our review of the post-Ferry cases does 
not convince us that the court has moved away from the Ferry 
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard,9 
We turn now to an examination of the correctness of 
the trial court's corpus delicti ruling on the motion for a 
new trial. Because Johnson made statements that potentially 
create corpus delicti concerns in both counts I and III, we 
will analyze the counts separately. With respect to count I, 
charging attempted murder by the use of heroin, the evidence 
shows that prior to the administration of the heroin, Johnson 
made statements indicating that she wanted to use it to 
overdose her husband. Under the pre- and posterime 
distinction adopted above, these remarks were not covered by 
the corpus delicti rule and were admissible as statements 
against interest. However, incriminating statements after 
she administered the heroin to her husband are subject to the 
corpus delicti rule. Included are Johnson's statement to 
Officer Vojtecky that she had given her husband heroin on 
January 21, 1989, and her statement to Cindy Orozco that the 
Hstuff didn't work." The trial court's ruling that these 
admissions were not subject to the corpus delicti rule was 
incorrect. 
Even though the court erred in admitting the 
evidence under the basis it stated, however, the error was 
harmless. An examination of the evidence of the corpus 
delicti on count I clearly establishes that it was sufficient 
to establish corpus delicti, even without these latter 
statements. Under the Utah corpus delicti rule, before 
postcrime inculpatory statements are admissible, the State 
must show by clear and convincing evidence that (i) a wrong 
was done and (ii) such wrong was the result of criminal 
conduct. See, e.g., State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41; State 
v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176; Johnson, 95 Utah at 580-81, 83 
P.2d at 1014-15. The first part of the corpus delicti test 
is met here, i.e., there is clear and convincing independent 
evidence of a wrong. Peggy Johnson stated that she wanted to 
purchase the heroin so that she could kill her husband with 
it. The heroin was purchased and delivered to her on 
January 21. There was also physical evidence that Johnson 
had placed harmful substances, including oxalic acid, in her 
husband's medicine on other occasions. Danny testified that 
five hours after taking his capsules on the night of 
January 21-22, he was dizzy and sweaty. He also testified 
that he vomited at that time. Danny's symptoms were 
consistent with the ingestion of heroin. 
9. Because we conclude that the evidence in this case is 
sufficient under Ferry to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, 
there is no occasion for us to address the "trustworthiness" 
standard pressed upon us by the State. See State v. Parker, 
315 N.C. 222, 236, 337 S.E.2d 487, 495 (1985). 
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There is likewise sufficient evidence to satisfy the 
second part of the corpus delicti test—that the wrong was 
caused by unlawful means. The same evidence supporting part 
one of the test also supports part two. Taken as a whole, 
this evidence is sufficient under Ferry to support the 
inference that the heroin was placed in the capsules and that 
they produced the violent physical reaction by Johnson's 
husband. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 
constitute clear and convincing proof of the corpus delicti 
of count I. Therefore, even though the trial judge may have 
erred in concluding that Johnson's postcrime statements 
regarding the administration of heroin in the capsules were 
not covered by the corpus delicti rule, any such error was 
harmless. Ample evidence for a foundation for the 
admissibility of those statements was adduced, even if not in 
the proper order. 
Turning to count III, attempted murder through the 
administration of oxalic acid, all Johnson's statements were 
subject to the corpus delicti rule because they were made 
after she had administered the drug. Again, the trial court 
erred when it admitted the evidence without first making a 
determination that the corpus delicti rule was satisfied. 
Nevertheless, as is the case with count I, we conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to allow 
the admission of Johnson's statements, and therefore, the 
error was harmless. 
The two elements to be proven under the corpus 
delicti rule are a wrong and linkage to criminal agency. In 
the case of oxalic acid, the wrong is the fact of the 
administration of oxalic acid. There is ample evidence that 
it was administered to Danny Johnson. A bottle was found in 
Johnson's home that contained the same substance found in the 
capsules Danny was taking. Danny also testified that when he 
took the capsules they upset his stomach and, on one occasion, 
burned his throat. As for the criminal agency, the presence 
of the substance in the ampicillin capsules without Danny's 
knowledge is sufficient proof. Here, as with count I, any 
error in admitting the postcrime inculpatory statements 
before finding the corpus delicti rule satisfied was harmless. 
Johnson's conviction on count I is affirmed. Her 
conviction on count III is vacated and replaced with a 
conviction for attempted second degree murder. Finally, her 
conviction on count II is reversed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M, Durham, Justice 
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